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In this paper, I study a simple game of the budgetary process. The game has three players. A spending-prone minister, who proposes a budget, a prime minister, who accepts or vetoes, & a bureaucrat who provides nonverifiable information about policy. The bureaucrat is appointed by the spending minister. I show that in this setting public spending is excessive. This result stems from the proposal power of the minister, & his incentive to appoint a spending-prone bureaucrat. Next, I examine two devices for controlling public spending: binding budget targets imposed by the prime minister & delegating veto power to a spending-averse finance minister. It is shown that the latter device is more effective than the former device to curb a spending prone minister, because it not only reduces the proposal power of the spending minister, but also induces him to appoint less spending-prone bureaucrats. 4 Tables, 23 References. Adapted from the source document.

Recent empirical research on voter turnout has revealed a variety of regularities. Citizens who expect to be asked about their turnout decisions after the elections are more likely to vote. Parents whose children enter the electorate are more likely to vote when their children live home than when they left home. Citizens without social networks acquire less information about politics. We develop a model that can explain these and other empirical findings. In our model, citizens receive disutility from being perceived not to have voted. This motivates a citizen to vote. Moreover, a citizen feels worse being perceived not to have voted when he is thought to have a strong opinion as this raises expectations about his voting behavior among peers. When a citizen anticipates that he will likely vote, the latter concern motivates him to acquire information, to participate in political discussions, and to vote. However, when a citizen anticipates that he will likely abstain from voting, he shies away from politics to lower his peers' expectations.

Decisions-makers often rely on information supplied by interested parties. In practice, some parties have easier access to information than other parties. In this light, we examine whether more powerful parties have a disproportionate influence on decisions. We show that more powerful parties influence decisions with higher probability. However, in expected terms, decisions do not depend on the relative strength of interested parties. When parties have not provided information, decisions are biased towards the less powerful parties. Finally, we show that compelling parties to supply information destroys incentives to collect information.

We study two aspects of globalization. It allows a decision-maker to go beyond his own local experience and to learn from other decision-makers in addressing common problems. This improves the identification and diffusion of best practices. It also provides extra information to `markets' that evaluate decision-makers: comparisons become possible. We identify conditions under which the globalization of markets helps or hurts (i) the communication among decision-makers about their own experience and (ii) the quality of the decision that is taken next. An important mediating factor is whether decision-making is centralized or decentralized.